A FOOTBALL ODYSSEY: THE FOOTBALL AGENTS JUDGMENTS IN CASE
C-428/23 ROGON V. DFB AND CASE C-209/23 RRC SPORTS V. FIFA
Benoît Keane
Solicitor-Advocate
ABSTRACT
This article examines the judgments of the EU Court of Justice in Rogon and RRC Sports – the
“Football Agents” cases – relating to the regulation of football agents by FIFA and national football
associations, in particular the FIFA Football Agents Regulations (FFAR). It describes the evolution
of the FFAR and summarises its main objectives and provisions. It sets out the relevant legal tests
to be applied under EU competition law to sports regulations such as the FFAR. It explains why
these tests were applied by the EU Court of Justice to the regulation of football agents who are not
direct members of FIFA (or national football associations) in the Rogon case. It then examines the
ndings of the EU Court of Justice in the RRC Sports case with respect to the lawfulness under EU
competition and free movement laws of specic provisions of the FFAR, in particular those relating
to the conict of interest rules, the service fee cap and the ethical requirements. It highlights the
reasonableness test to be applied to claims of abuse of dominance against sports federations. It
also analyses the judgment of the EU Court of Justice with respect to the compliance of the FFAR
rules with EU data protection law. It concludes that the judgment is a strong endorsement of the
FFAR that will have a major impact on pending cases in Europe and around the world.
KEYWORDS
EU Court of Justice, Football Agents, FFAR, EU competition law, EU free movement law, EU privacy
law.
https://doi.org/10.36151/fifalegaljournal.2026.2.03
Benoît Keane
Solicitor-Advocate1
Summary: 1. Background. 2. FFAR: Key Provisions. 2.1. Conflicts of Interest.
2.2. Remuneration. 2.3. Player Welfare. 3. Background to the Cases. 4. Legal
Analysis. 5. Regulation and Licensing of Football Agents. 6. Competition
Analysis of FFAR Provisions. 6.1. Competition Analysis of the Conflict of
Interest Rules in the FFAR. 6.2. Competition Analysis of the Remuneration
Provisions in the FFAR. 6.3. Competition Analysis of the Ethical Requirements
in the FFAR. 7. Disclosure and Publication. 7.1. Disclosure and Publication:
Competition Analysis. 7.2. Disclosure and Publication: Data Protection
Analysis. 8. FFAR and Claims of Abuse of Dominance. 9. FFAR and Free
Movement. 10. Return to National Courts.
1 Solicitor-Advocate at Keane Legal (Brussels) specialising in EU and sports law. The
author represented FIFA in the RRC Sports case before the EU Court of Justice. All
views expressed relating to the Football Agents judgments are, however, strictly
personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of FIFA.
A FOOTBALL
ODYSSEY: THE
FOOTBALL AGENTS
JUDGMENTS IN
CASE C42823
ROGON V. DFB AND
CASE C20923 RRC
SPORTS V. FIFA
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A FOOTBALL ODYSSEY: THE FOOTBALL AGENTS JUDGMENTS
“Sing to me of the man, Muse, the man of twists and turns, driven time and again
o course...” The Odyssey (Homer, translation of the opening lines by Robert
Fagles)
After a legal journey lasting almost ten years, judges at the EU Court
of Justice delivered judgments that will aect the governance of football
agents – and indeed sports governance – for years to come. Whereas other
sports cases have concerned specific rules, the Rogon and RRC Sports
judgments (collectively, “Football Agents”) ranged from existential questions
about whether FIFA and national associations can regulate agents at all to
specific questions covering almost the entire rulebook of the FIFA Football
Agents Regulations (“FFAR”). The rulings establish important principles on
the scope of the regulatory authority of sports federations under EU law. The
EU Court of Justice also assessed the rules governing agents in relation to
conflicts of interest, player welfare and – most controversially – service fees
under EU competition, free movement and data protection law. So extensive
is the judgment on the FFAR that it runs to 385 paragraphs. A veritable epic
but, in the end, the verdict is clear.
1. BACKGROUND
The origins of the Football Agents cases lie, strangely, in the decision by
FIFA in 2015 not to regulate agents. FIFA had previously operated a licensing
system for football agents which had been in place since the 1990s (the
“FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations”). This system had been challenged in an
antitrust complaint before the European Commission and subsequently
before the EU General Court. In the 2005 judgment in Piau, the EU General
Court – albeit with some reservations – recognised that FIFA could regulate
football agents, given the absence of EU or national legislation. The EU
General Court observed that “certain practices on the part of players’
agents could, in the past, have harmed players and clubs, financially and
professionally”. Accordingly, the EU General Court accepted that FIFA could
regulate agents to achieve “the dual objectives of raising professional and
ethical standards for the occupation of players’ agent in order to protect
players, who have a short career”.2 FIFA was, at this point, in a strong legal
position to regulate agents.
2 Case T-193/02, Laurent Piau v. European Commission, EU:T:2005:22 (“Piau”),
paragraph 102.
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Then, in 2015, FIFA abandoned the licensing system in favour of a
deregulatory model. The FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries
(“RWI”) allowed any natural or legal person to act as an “intermediary”,
provided they were registered with national associations and adhered to
certain minimum criteria. FIFA’s rationale for this deregulatory approach
was that agents were involved in only a small proportion of all international
transfers. However, critics pointed out that FIFA lacked the will or resources
to regulate agents, deciding to walk away rather than address the regulatory
gap.3 Whatever the reasons, FIFA lost control.
Even agents conceded that deregulation had turned football agency into
a “wild west”.4 Anyone could become a registered intermediary – and anyone
did. Systemic problems soon became apparent. With regulation devolved to
national associations, a fragmented regulatory system emerged, with each
country applying dierent rules. The lack of uniform regulation encouraged
conflicts of interest, with agents able to act not just for a player and the
engaging club but even for the releasing club at the same time.5 Owing to
information asymmetry and the gatekeeper role of agents, transfers could
be engineered in the interests of agents rather than of the players they
represented. Data showed a huge increase in expenditure on agents,6 giving
rise to concerns that fees were no longer commensurate with the services
being provided to clubs and players. Most seriously, agents were being
associated with illegal activities such as corruption, money laundering,
fraud and human tracking involving minors. An EU report on agents led by
Professor Parrish concluded: “Whilst the old licensing system was flawed,
many respondents argued that it was underpinned with sound principles
and a return to it, or a similar system, is necessary in order to ensure that
players and clubs are engaging a professional agent.”7
3 De Marco, “The End of the Licensed Football Agent?”, Blackstone Chambers Sports
Law Bulletin, 21 October 2014.
4 The Guardian, “Football agents fear ‘wild west’ as Fifa reforms seek to cap fees”, 31
March 2015.
5 The 2016 transfer of French player Paul Pogba is perhaps the best-known example,
with the player’s agent acting for the player, the engaging club (Manchester United)
and the releasing club (Juventus FC). See: Financial Times, “Mino Raiola: meet the
super-agent behind Pogba and Ibrahimovic”, 28 October 2016.
6 See for example: FIFA Global Transfer Market Report 2017 showing that club
expenditure on intermediary commissions had increased from USD 218.4 m in 2013
to 369 m in 2016. The FIFA Intermediaries in International Transfers Report (2017)
estimated total expenditure to club intermediaries between 2013 and 2017 to be USD
1.59 billion.
7 Prof. Parrish, Dr Cattaneo, Prof. Lindholm, Prof. Mittag, Prof. Perez-Gonzalez, Assistant
Prof. Smokvina, “Promoting and Supporting Good Governance in the European
Football Agents Industry”, Final Report, 2019 (“Parrish Report”).
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Under new leadership, FIFA conceded that deregulation had been a
mistake. FIFA embarked upon a programme of reform aimed at reconnecting
the regulation of agents with the proper functioning of the football transfer
system. In March 2017, the FIFA Football Stakeholders Committee discussed
the establishment of a task force to review and improve the international
transfer system.8 The task force subsequently identified the regulation
of agents as a priority, and in September 2018 the Committee endorsed
proposals for a new regulatory framework, including the reintroduction of a
licensing system for agents.9
From 2017 to 2022, FIFA conducted a wide-ranging consultation process
on the regulation of agents involving clubs, players, leagues, confederations
and agents. Some agent organisations, however, were highly critical of the
consultation process and refused to take part. Notwithstanding this, FIFA
received hundreds of comments and proposals on draft regulations.10 The
Council of Europe11 and the European Parliament12 also called upon FIFA to
put in place a sound framework for the exercise of the profession of agent
in order to protect the integrity of the football transfer system. The result
of this extensive consultation was the adoption by FIFA of the FFAR in
December 2022.
2. FFAR: KEY PROVISIONS
The core objectives of the FFAR, set out in Article 1, are linked to the
objectives of FIFA’s regulation of the football transfer system, notably the
protection of contractual stability, competitive balance and the regularity of
football competitions.13 The FFAR aims, amongst other objectives, to set and
8 FIFA Press Release “First Meeting of FIFA Football Stakeholders Committee”, March,
23 2017
9 FIFA Press Release “FIFA Holds Talks with Agents on Possible Revision of Football
Intermediaries System”, April, 20 2018; FIFA Press Release “Football Stakeholders
Endorse Landmark Reforms of the Transfer System”, September, 25 2018.
10 FIFA Circular 1827 states: “The FFAR were adopted following a comprehensive,
genuine, and inclusive consultation process where over 300 proposals regarding
the FFAR were considered and analysed over the last four years.”
11 Council of Europe Committee Report, “Football Governance: Business and Values”
(2021).
12 European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2021 on EU sports policy: assessment
and possible ways forward (2021/2058(INI)), OJ C 224, 8.6.2022, pp. 2–10.
13 Article 1(1) FFAR states: “FIFA has a statutory obligation to regulate all matters
relating to the football transfer system. The core objectives of the football transfer
system are to: a) protect the contractual stability between professional players and
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raise minimum professional and ethical standards for agents, limit conflicts
of interest and protect football players. Article 2, which defines the scope of
the FFAR, provides that it regulates “Football Agent Services”14 connected
to a transfer (defined as a “Transaction”15) with an international dimension.
The FFAR reintroduces a licensing system, with Article 4 requiring
natural persons to pass an examination administered by FIFA in order to
become a “Football Agent”.16 The licence is issued for an indefinite period
(subject to continuing professional development) and permits the agent
to conduct “Football Agent Services” on a worldwide basis.17 Indeed, only
football agents may provide such services.18 Agents are required to adhere
to FIFA’s Statutes, regulations, directives and decisions as well as those of
the competent bodies of national federations and confederations.19
In addition, the FFAR introduces new governance features for agents.
FIFA created a representative group for agents, the Football Agent Working
Group. The FFAR establishes the Agents Chamber as part of the FIFA
Football Tribunal, which agents may use on a voluntary basis to settle
disputes. Details of registered football agents are to be provided to FIFA and
published on its website so that players and clubs can verify that a person is
in fact a registered football agent.
The FFAR rules governing the representation of players and clubs fall,
broadly speaking, into the following categories: (i) conflict of interest rules;
(ii) remuneration; and (iii) player welfare. While each has distinct objectives,
they are also interlinked in terms of the overall application of the FFAR. Each
is considered in turn below.
clubs; b) encourage the training of young players; c) promote a spirit of solidarity
between elite and grassroots football; d) protect minors; e) maintain competitive
balance; and f) ensure the regularity of sporting competitions.”
14 Football Agent Services are defined as: “football-related services performed for or on
behalf of a Client, including any negotiation, communication relating or preparatory
to the same, or other related activity, with the purpose, objective and/or intention of
concluding a Transaction.”
15 A Transaction is defined as: “(i) the employment, registration or deregistration
of a player with a club or a Single-Entity League; (ii) the employment of a coach
with a club, Single-Entity League or a member association; (iii) the transfer of the
registration of a player from one club to another; (iv) the creation, termination or
variation of an Individual’s terms of employment.”
16 Article 23 FFAR provides an exception for agents who were licensed under the
previous FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations.
17 Articles 8 and 9 FFAR.
18 Article 11 FFAR.
19 Article 16(1) FFAR.
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2.1. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The FFAR introduces new measures to prohibit or limit conflicts of
interest. As a general rule, a football agent is prohibited from representing
more than one party.20
This means that a football agent may not act for all parties, as the conflict
is irreconcilable. Likewise, a football agent may not act for both a releasing
club and a player, as the club’s interest is to maximise the transfer fee (and,
if necessary, to block the transfer), whereas the player’s interest is to have a
lower transfer fee in order to maximise the potential salary at the engaging
club. For similar reasons, an agent may not act for both the releasing club
and the engaging club.21
The only exception to this general rule is that a football agent may act
for both the player and the engaging club in the same transfer, provided
that both clients give their explicit written consent. Although there is a
potential conflict even in such a relationship (as the club may wish to lower
the player’s salary while the player will wish to increase it), FIFA considered
this limited exception acceptable following its consultations, because the
engaging club and the player share an interest in the successful conclusion
of the transfer and in keeping any transfer fee payable to the releasing club
as low as possible.
To safeguard the integrity of the conflict of interest rules, connected
football agents may not act in the same transfer.22
2.2. REMUNERATION
The FFAR regulates the service fees of football agents.
The service fee is to be based on the player’s remuneration where the
agent represents the player (and the engaging club, where relevant), or on
the transfer compensation where the agent represents the releasing club.23
The remuneration may not be calculated on the basis of future transfer
compensation received by the club from a subsequent transfer of the
player.24
The guiding principle is ‘client pays’, namely that an agent should be
paid by the person or club that the agent represents; payment of the fee by
20 Article 12(8) FFAR.
21 Article 12(9) FFAR.
22 Article 12(10) FFAR.
23 Article 15(1) FFAR.
24 Article 15 FFAR.
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any third party is prohibited.25 The exception to this principle relates to the
limited conflict of interest permitted where an agent acts for both the player
and the engaging club. However, to safeguard the football agent’s fiduciary
duty to the player, the engaging club may pay no more than 50% of the total
service fee due.26 There are also exceptions for low-value representations
but, again, the fiduciary duty to the player must remain unaected.27
The service fee must be paid incrementally over the course of the player’s
contract. Only the remuneration actually received by a player is subject to
the payment of a service fee, calculated on a pro rata basis. This means that,
if the player leaves a club mid-contract, the service fee is no longer due to
the agent concerned.28
Perhaps the most controversial element of the FFAR is the introduction
of the “Service Fee Cap” in Article 15 FFAR, which limits the amount of
remuneration that football agents can receive. The FFAR sets out the
following table:
Client
SERVICE FEE CAP
Remuneration less than
or equal to USD 200,000
(or equivalent)
Remuneration above USD
200,000 (or equivalent)
Individual 5% of the Individual’s
Remuneration
3% of the Individual’s
Remuneration
Engaging Entity 5% of the Individual’s
Remuneration
3% of the Individual’s
Remuneration
Engaging Entity
and Individual
(permitted dual
representation)
10% of the Individual’s
Remuneration
6% of the Individual’s
Remuneration
Releasing
Entity (Transfer
compensation)
10% of the transfer compensation
That said, the service fee cap relates only to the transfer and does not
apply to ‘other services’ provided by the football agent to players or clubs.
25 Article 14(2) FFAR.
26 Article 14(10) FFAR.
27 Article 14(3) FFAR. The exception applies where the player earns less than USD
200,000 per annum.
28 Article 14(7) FFAR.
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These include legal advice, financial planning, scouting, consultancy, the
management of image rights and the negotiation of commercial contracts.
However, services provided in the 24 months before or after the transfer
are presumed to form part of the football agent’s services unless proven
otherwise.29
2.3. PLAYER WELFARE
A key objective of the FFAR is to protect the interests of players who, as
the EU General Court had previously recognised in Piau, have short careers.
Article 5 FFAR sets out ethical requirements that football agents must
satisfy at all times, both when submitting their application and after
receiving a licence. A football agent must never have been convicted of a
serious criminal charge.30 Likewise, persons who have been suspended by
a regulatory body or sports governing body for two years or more for ethical
or professional misconduct may not act as agents. The FFAR also prohibits
agents from holding positions at clubs, leagues or federations – or indeed
from holding any interest in a club, academy or league.31
In order to be valid, representation agreements must be in writing
(with specified details to be included32) and may not exceed two years in
duration.33 Where the representation is exclusive, the FFAR provides that
other football agents may approach the player only in the final two months
of the representation agreement.34 However, players always have the right
29 Article 15(3) and (4) FFAR.
30 Article 5(ii) FFAR: [...] “never have been convicted of a criminal charge, including any
related settlements, regarding matters related to organised crime, drug tracking,
corruption, bribery, money laundering, tax evasion, fraud, match manipulation,
misappropriation of funds, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, forgery, legal
malpractice, sexual abuse, violent crimes, harassment, exploitation or child or
vulnerable young adult tracking.”
31 Article 5 FFAR: [...] “(iv.) not be an ocial or employee of FIFA, a confederation, a
member association, a league, a club, a body that represents the interests of clubs or
leagues or any organisation connected directly or indirectly with such organisations
and entities; the only exception is where an applicant has been appointed or elected
to a body of FIFA, a confederation or a member association, representing the
interests of Football Agents; (v.) not hold, either personally or through their Agency,
any Interest in a club, academy, league or Single-Entity League.”
32 Article 12(7) FFAR states: “A Representation Agreement is valid only if it contains
the following minimum requirements: a) The names of the parties b) The duration (if
applicable) c) The amount of the service fee due to the Football Agent d) The nature
of the Football Agent Services to be provided e) The parties’ signatures.”
33 Article 12(3) FFAR.
34 Article 16(1) FFAR.
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to represent themselves.35 The FFAR also has specific rules relating to
minors.36
The FFAR sets out disclosure requirements under which football
agents must submit to FIFA’s platform the representation agreement, any
agreements relating to other services, information on the service fee and on
fees for other services, and any cooperation agreement with other football
agents to share revenues. In addition, the football agent must disclose
any information that may aect compliance with the ethical requirements
(and other eligibility requirements). Any settlement agreement with a client
should also be uploaded.37
As a complement to the disclosure requirements, FIFA publishes
information relating to football agents and their services. In accordance with
Article 19 FFAR, FIFA makes available information on all agents, including
their names and details, as well as on the clients they represent, specifying
whether the representation is exclusive or non-exclusive, the end date of
the representation agreement, the services provided to the respective
clients, any sanctions imposed on agents and their clients, and details of all
transactions involving agents, including the amounts of service fees paid to
them.38
Many of these rules came under scrutiny before the EU Court of Justice
in RRC Sports.
35 In accordance with Article 12(13) FFAR, players always have the right to represent
themselves in negotiations for a transfer with the FFAR deeming as null and void
any provision in the representation agreement that limits the player’s ability to
autonomously negotiate and conclude an employment contract without the
involvement of a football agent.
36 The FFAR introduces special rules for the protection of minors, requiring agents
to have completed a designated course to represent minors. A football agent may
approach a minor only in the six months before the minor reaches the age at which
they may sign their first professional contract with the written consent of the minor’s
guardians. The FFAR prohibits the remuneration of agents for representation of a
minor unless it relates to the minor player’s first or subsequent professional contract.
While the subject of other cases, these rules were not challenged in the RRC Sports
case. See: Article 13 FFAR and Article 14(9) FFAR.
37 Article 16(1)(j)–(k) FFAR.
38 Article 19 FFAR states: “FIFA shall make available: a) the names and details
of all Football Agents; b) the Clients that Football Agents represent, the
exclusivity or non-exclusivity of their representation and the expiry date of the
Representation Agreement; c) the Football Agent Services provided to each
Client; d) any sanctions imposed on Football Agents and Clients; and e) details
of all Transactions involving Football Agents, including the service fee amounts
paid to Football Agents.”
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3. BACKGROUND TO THE CASES
FIFA’s decision to return as regulator was greeted with hostility by some
agents. Cases were launched in jurisdictions across Europe and, indeed,
around the world.39 Some cases challenged specific provisions of the FFAR,
such as the conflict of interest rules or the remuneration provisions; others
challenged almost the entire rulebook. The adoption of the FFAR turned out
to be just the start of its legal journey.
In a case before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), the panel decided
that the FFAR remuneration provisions were not anti-competitive.40 By
contrast, an English arbitral panel came to the opposite view in a case
brought by major football agencies against the Football Association’s
national regulations.41 Both arbitral panels, however, agreed that the conflict
of interest provisions were valid.
The RRC Sports case, brought by an agency before the German courts,
was just one of many in which almost the entire rulebook was challenged.
The case was referred to the EU Court of Justice at the request of FIFA on
31 March 2023.42 By coincidence, the German Bundesgerichtshof (Federal
Supreme Court) referred questions at around the same time in the Rogon
case43 relating to the right of national federations to regulate non-members
such as agents. Although not joined, these two Football Agents cases shared
the same procedural pathway, being heard on the same day and assigned to
the same Advocate General, who delivered his Opinions on the same day.44
The judgments were delivered just one week apart, with suspense building
from the Rogon judgment on 9 July 2026 to the RRC Sports judgment on
16 July 2026. Coinciding with the film release of The Odyssey,45 the rulings
promised an epic finale.
39 Cases have been filed in Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, the Netherlands and
Spain. A complaint was filed with the European Commission (Case AT.40837 FFAR)
but was closed in September 2025. A number of other complaints have been filed
with competition authorities.
40 CAS 2023/O/9370, Professional Football Agents Association (PROFAA) v. FIFA
(“PROFAA”).
41 Arbitral award, CAA Base Limited, Key Stone Management Ltd (t/a Wasserman),
Stellar Football Limited, Areté Management Limited v. The Football Association, 30
November 2023 (“CAA Base”).
42 Case C-209/23, RRC Sports v. FIFA, EU:C:2026:597 (“RRC Sports”).
43 Case C-428/23, Rogon v. Deutscher Fußball-Bund (DFB), EU:C:2026:563 (“Rogon”).
44 The hearing was held on 12 February 2025 and Advocate General Emiliou’s Opinions
were delivered on 15 May 2025.
45 The Odyssey, Directed by Christopher Nolan, Universal Pictures, 2026.
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4. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Before addressing the substance, it is necessary to recall the principles
underlying the EU Court of Justice’s judgments in the respective Football
Agents cases.
As a preliminary point, sport is subject to EU law in so far as it constitutes an
economic activity. While certain purely sporting rules are not of an economic
nature,46 the same cannot be said of regulations on agents, which relate to
the supply of services to clubs and players.47 EU competition law applies to
the conduct of enterprises (or “undertakings” in the English text).48 There
are two key provisions underpinning EU competition law in the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”): Article 101 TFEU prohibits in
particular agreements between undertakings or decisions by associations
of undertakings that have as their object or eect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition; Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse by an
undertaking of a dominant market position. In both cases, there must be an
eect on trade between EU Member States.
Consolidating long-standing case law, the EU Court of Justice outlined
in Rogon how EU competition law applies to sports organisations or sports
federations:
“Article 101(1) TFEU is applicable to any entity where it carries out an economic ac-
tivity and which, for that purpose, must be classified as an ‘undertaking’, including
any entity that is created in the form of an association which, according to its sta-
tutes, has as its associative purpose the organisation and control of a given sport,
provided that it carries out an economic activity in relation to that sport. Moreo-
ver, that provision is also applicable to any entity which, although not necessarily
constituting an undertaking, may be classified as an ‘association of undertakings’
because it brings together operators active on that market.”49
Consequently, FIFA and national associations (such as the DFB) are
considered to have the status of an “association of undertakings”, in this
case in the upstream agency markets relating to the recruitment of players
46 According to long-standing case law of the EU Court of Justice, this is the case in
particular with respect to rules on the exclusion of foreign players from the composition
of teams participating in national team competitions or the determination of ranking
criteria used to select the athletes participating individually in competitions.
47 Rogon, paragraph 25.
48 The French version uses the term “entreprise”. The term “enterprise” was actually
used in the original English translation of the Treaty of Rome establishing the
European Economic Community (1958) submitted to the United Nations (UNTS vol.
298), but the term “undertaking” was later used in ocial English versions.
49 Rogon, paragraph 28. See also: RRC Sports, paragraphs 83–89.
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or coaches.50 It follows that the regulations on agents constitute a decision
by an association of undertakings falling within the scope of Article 101
TFEU.51 For completeness, restrictions must have an eect on trade between
EU Member States, but this condition is easily met, even where regulations
are limited to a single Member State, as the EU Court of Justice confirmed
in Rogon.52 The main question is usually whether there is a restriction of
competition by object or by eect arising from the sports regulation, and, if
so, whether the restriction is justified.
Restrictions ‘by object’ are those which, by their very nature, are regarded
as being harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition; there is no
need to examine their eects. For this reason, the concept of a restriction by
object must be interpreted strictly.53 Classic examples of such restrictions
are price-fixing and market-sharing cartels. However, other types of conduct
may also be considered to have an anti-competitive object, even if they are
not as harmful to competition as hardcore restrictions. To determine whether
there is a restriction by object, it is necessary to examine, first, the content
of the agreement, decision or practice in question; second, the economic
and legal context of which it forms a part; and, third, its objectives.54 In its
recent ruling in CD Tondela (concerning COVID-19 measures adopted by the
Portuguese league),55 the EU Court of Justice stressed the importance of
taking account of the context in which a decision is adopted, with Advocate
General Emiliou memorably stating that “context always matters”.56 In
Football Agents, the EU Court of Justice also highlighted the importance of
context in the analysis.
As regards a restriction of competition by eect, this requires an analysis
of the eect upon the relevant product and geographic markets (having
regard to a realistic counterfactual). The EU Court of Justice noted in its
rulings that the following relevant markets could be aected: (i) the market
for agents’ services in the international transfer of professional players and
coaches; and (ii) the labour market for players and coaches.57 The EU Court
50 Rogon, paragraph 32; RRC Sports, paragraph 86.
51 FIFA and other sports federations may also be considered to be undertakings in their
own right for the purpose of Article 102 TFEU. See further Section 8 below.
52 Rogon, paragraphs 45–46.
53 Case C-333/21, European Superleague Company, EU:C:2023:1011 (“Superleague”),
paragraph 161.
54 Superleague, paragraph 165.
55 Case C-133/24, CD Tondela, Liga Portuguesa et al., EU:C:2026:361 (“CD Tondela”),
paragraph 43, citing in particular Superleague, paragraph 165.
56 CD Tondela, Opinion of Advocate General Emiliou, EU:2025:364, paragraph 66.
57 RRC Sports, paragraphs 171–173.
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of Justice left the eects analysis to the national courts, proceeding on the
assumption that there is an eect.
Not all measures that restrict freedom of action are necessarily prohibited.
In Wouters,58 concerning professional regulations, and subsequently in
Meca Medina,59 concerning anti-doping regulations, the EU Court of
Justice held that a restriction is permitted where it is inherent in, and
proportionate to, the pursuit of a legitimate objective. In Superleague, the
EU Court of Justice held that this exception for legitimate objectives in the
public interest applied only to restrictions by eect, not to those by object.60
Whereas previously the categorisation of the restriction did not matter, it is
now necessary first to establish its nature.61
In the Football Agents cases, the EU Court of Justice seems to have
consolidated the tests, stating:
“[...] not every agreement between undertakings, every decision by an association
of undertakings or every concerted practice which restricts the freedom of action
of the undertakings party to that agreement or subject to compliance with that
decision or participating in that practice necessarily falls within the prohibition
laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU. Indeed, the examination of the economic and legal
context of which some of those agreements, decisions and practices form a part
may lead to a finding, first, that they are justified by the pursuit of one or more le-
gitimate objectives in the public interest which are not per se anti-competitive in
nature; second, that the specific means used to pursue those objectives are genui-
nely necessary for that purpose; and, third, that, even if those means prove to have
an inherent eect of, at the very least potentially, restricting or distorting compe-
tition, that inherent eect does not go beyond what is necessary, in particular by
eliminating all competition.”62
Irrespective of whether there is a restriction of competition by object
or by eect (including where there is no public interest objective), the
EU Court of Justice confirmed in Superleague that Article 101(3) TFEU
58 Case C-309/99, J.C.J. Wouters, J.W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse
Belastingadviseurs BV v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten,
EU:C:2002:98 (“Wouters”).
59 Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission, EU:C:2006:492 (“Meca
Medina”).
60 Superleague, paragraphs 183 and 195.
61 Professor Weatherill neatly sums up the change in the legal test post-Superleague:
“The point is that if a practice escapes the reach of Article 101(1) according to this
formula, there is no need to assess whether it is a restriction of competition by object
or by eect. It is not a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) at
all. This is now changed.” See: Weatherill, “The impact of the rulings of 21 December
2023 on the structure of EU sports law”, International Sports Law Journal (2023), pp.
409–415, at p. 411.
62 Rogon, paragraph 36; RRC Sports, paragraph 183.
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potentially provides an exemption63 where the restriction is indispensable
to promoting economic progress while allowing consumers a fair share of
the resulting benefits without eliminating competition.64 Accordingly, this
route to exemption is available for regulations found to restrict competition
by object. In Superleague, the EU Court of Justice accepted that objectives
in the public interest could be ‘translated’ into economic benefits65 – a
point followed in RRC Sports.66 This exemption also applies, however,
to regulations (by eect) that do not pursue a public interest objective
but are instead implemented by a sports federation to achieve economic
eciencies (such as the collective sale of media rights relating to a sports
competition).67
There is now a large degree of overlap between the public interest test
and the economic benefit test68, with both requiring an assessment of the
necessity (or, in the case of Article 101(3) TFEU, the indispensability) of the
restriction, in that there should be no less restrictive genuine alternative, as
well as of its proportionality (in particular, no elimination of competition).69
63 Superleague, paragraph 189.
64 An exemption pursuant to Article 101(3) TFEU is subject to four cumulative
conditions as set out by the EU Court of Justice in Superleague at paragraph 190:
“First, it must be demonstrated with a sucient degree of probability that the
agreement, decision by an association of undertakings or concerted practice in
question makes it possible to achieve eciency gains, by contributing either to
improving the production or distribution of the products or services concerned, or to
promoting technical or economic progress. Second, it must be demonstrated, to the
same degree of probability, that an equitable part of the profit resulting from those
eciency gains is reserved for the users. Third, the agreement, decision or practice
in question must not impose on the participating undertakings restrictions which
are not indispensable for achieving such eciency gains. Fourth, that agreement,
decision or practice must not give the participating undertakings the opportunity to
eliminate all eective competition for a substantial part of the products or services
concerned.”
65 Superleague, paragraph 196.
66 RRC Sports, paragraphs 223 and 224.
67 As confirmed in Superleague, paragraphs 231 et seq.
68 See further: Keane, “Balancing autonomy and legality: the proportionality challenge
in EU law post Topfit, Superleague and Royal Antwerp” in Colucci and Bastianon
(eds), Twenty Years after Meca Medina (SLPC, 2026). That chapter was submitted
for publication before the delivery of the Football Agents cases.
69 Rogon, paragraph 38. The EU Court of Justice stated: “Furthermore, in view of the
requirement that the conduct at issue must, strictly speaking, be necessary and
proportionate, it should be noted that the examination of that requirement involves
[...] first of all, determining whether the specific means used in a given case to
pursue a legitimate objective in the public interest are appropriate for ensuring the
attainment of that objective, next, assessing whether recourse to those means is
necessary in order to attain that objective, which implies that there are no other
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In summary, where a regulation falls within the scope of EU competition
law as a decision by an association of undertakings that aects trade
between Member States, the legal test can be set out as involving the
following steps:
– Step 1: Does the regulation restrict competition by object or eect?
– Step 2: If by eect, is the regulation necessary and proportionate to
the achievement of a legitimate objective in the public interest?
– Step 3: If by object, or by eect where no public interest objective
is pursued, is it justified under Article 101(3) TFEU as an economic
benefit to consumers that is indispensable and does not eliminate
competition?
It is against these principles that the EU Court of Justice assessed first
the governance of agents by sports federations and then the detailed
provisions of the FFAR in the respective Football Agents cases.
5. REGULATION AND LICENSING OF FOOTBALL AGENTS
The central question in the Rogon case was whether a sports federation
could adopt regulations that are not only addressed to its members but also
govern the use of services provided by non-member undertakings, such as
football agents.70 The EU Court of Justice answered in the armative.
The EU Court of Justice recognised the application of EU competition
law to the regulation of agents.71 However, the regulation of non-members
– such as agents – does not in itself constitute a ‘by object’ restriction of
competition. The EU Court of Justice stated: “the mere fact that regulations
adopted by a sports federation are addressed to its members, whilst also
measures that would be as eective for that purpose whilst being less restrictive
of competition, and, finally, verifying that the restrictive eects of the measures
adopted are not disproportionate to such an objective, in particular by eliminating
all competition on the relevant market.” A similar finding was made in RRC Sports,
at paragraph 227, which refers to “alternative measures which might genuinely be
envisaged.”
70 Rogon, paragraph 20. The first question referred was framed around the application
of the Wouters/Meca Medina test: “Do the principles developed by the Court of
Justice of the European Union in the judgments in Wouters of 19 February 2002 (C-
309/99) and Meca Medina of 18 July 2006 (C-519/04) [...] apply to the regulations
of a sports association, which are addressed to members of the association and
regulate the use of services of undertakings outside the association on a market
upstream of the association’s activities?”
71 Rogon, paragraphs 26–34.
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regulating the use of the services of third-party undertakings not belonging
to that federation, cannot, in itself, [...] be regarded, by its very nature, in
the economic and legal context at issue in the main proceedings, as being
particularly harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition.”72
The EU Court of Justice recognised, in particular, the governance role
of sports federations, stating that a sports federation “is required to adopt
regulations capable of having implications for the eco-system which they
regulate and control”.73 In this ecosystem, the EU Court of Justice noted
that “clubs, national federations, players and agents, must interact and, to
a certain extent, cooperate in order to ensure the viability of the sector and
its attractiveness to supporters and spectators”.74
The fact that a sports regulation governs the activities of non-members
of a sports federation does not prevent such a regulation from being justified
by legitimate objectives in the public interest.75 Nor does it mean that
such regulation cannot be necessary76 or, for that matter, proportionate.77
Indeed, the EU Court of Justice noted that, in previous cases relating to the
legitimate objectives pursued by professional regulations, those regulations
had aected non-members, such as final consumers in the case of minimum
fees put in place to ensure quality of service.78
With respect to agents, the EU Court of Justice observed that “the
reciprocal competitive position of [football] clubs on the various markets
in which they are present, such as sports ticketing, sponsorship or
merchandising markets, depends primarily on their performances when
participating in sporting competitions”. The EU Court of Justice recognised
that this sporting performance “is closely linked to the composition of the
teams over which the agents exercise a certain influence”. Thus, football
agents are not merely “inputs” providing services to clubs in an upstream
market but exert influence over the key competitive component of clubs:
the team.79
In short, the EU Court of Justice confirmed that sports federations can
regulate the activities of non-members. The judgment does not require an
72 Rogon, paragraph 51.
73 Rogon, paragraph 58.
74 Rogon, paragraph 59.
75 Rogon, paragraph 53.
76 Rogon, paragraphs 54 and 60.
77 Rogon, paragraph 55.
78 Citing Case C-136/12, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, EU:C:2013:489, paragraphs
53 and 54, and Joined Cases C-427/16 and C-428/16, CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria and
FrontEx International, EU:C:2017:890, paragraphs 53–55.
79 Rogon, paragraph 44.
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assessment of direct and significant influence to determine whether the
activity concerned by the sports regulation relates to a sports federation’s
mission.80 Nor is there any suggestion that the regulations must be adopted
following consultation with, let alone the approval of, non-members. Instead,
the EU Court of Justice leaves the analysis to the established legitimate
objective, necessity and proportionality test.
This finding was followed in RRC Sports, in which FIFA was recognised as
having the right to govern football agents. The EU Court of Justice stated:
“Since the organisation and conduct of such competitions may give rise to the
pursuit of ancillary economic activities, which may themselves influence those
competitions, it cannot be regarded as necessarily unlawful for an association
such as FIFA to adopt rules intended to regulate relations between, on the one
hand, its members and their aliates and, on the other, undertakings liable to have
an economic interest in the organisation of those competitions.”81
Consequently, the mere requirement that agents submit to FIFA’s
regulations and to the jurisdiction of the CAS was not considered to restrict
competition by object.82 Moreover, any restriction may be considered
justified by the objective of ensuring a higher level of protection for the
agents’ clients and, indeed, for the agents themselves, in particular by
providing, on a global scale, a uniform legal framework with a single decision-
making mechanism.83
6. COMPETITION ANALYSIS OF FFAR PROVISIONS
In response to the second question referred in Rogon, the EU Court of
Justice held that the competition analysis may relate to specific rules which
have dierent objectives. However, the EU Court of Justice agreed with the
Advocate General that it may be “artificial” to split up a set of rules. Instead,
a holistic approach may be more appropriate in some cases. The EU Court
of Justice concluded that the public interest “does not necessarily have
to be assessed with regard to each of the provisions of the regulations at
issue, but with regard to a set of provisions pursuing a distinct objective
or producing a distinct eect”.84 This finding had a significant impact on
80 Rogon, paragraph 69. The Advocate General had suggested that there be a significant
link to the activity concerned but was not followed on this point, arguably because it
forms part of the necessity test in any event.
81 RRC Sports, paragraph 81.
82 RRC Sports, paragraph 143.
83 RRC Sports, paragraph 209.
84 Rogon, paragraph 78, citing the Opinion of Advocate General Emiliou, paragraph 79.
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the approach of the EU Court of Justice in the subsequent RRC Sports
judgment, in which it took a more holistic approach to the review of the
FFAR. This article accordingly addresses the competition analysis by
subject matter: (i) conflicts of interest; (ii) remuneration; and (iii) ethical
requirements.
6.1. COMPETITION ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT
OF INTEREST RULES IN THE FFAR
The EU Court of Justice dismissed the proposition that the conflict of
interest rules in Article 12(8)–(10) FFAR restricted competition by object. The
mere requirement that agents act for their client and may, exceptionally,
act in dual representation for both the player (or coach) and the engaging
club is not harmful to competition. On the contrary, the EU Court of Justice
recalled that “the EU antitrust rules are not directly intended to ensure
that economic operators are free to pursue their commercial activities”
but rather to ensure that businesses do not distort competition on a given
market to the detriment of consumers and EU citizens.85 In going back to first
principles, the EU Court of Justice is essentially saying that EU competition
law does not create a regulatory race to the bottom.
Even if such rules are found to restrict competition by eect,86 the EU
Court of Justice held that they were justified by the legitimate objective of
protecting agents’ clients against possible behaviour of agents contrary to
the ethical requirements applicable to this activity.87 While leaving it to the
national court to assess whether informed consent would be as eective,
the EU Court of Justice considered the conflict of interest rules to be
proportionate, given the dierent approach taken to less serious forms of
conflict:
“Article 12(8) to (10) of the FFAR merely requires informed consent in situations
where potential conflicts of interest are less serious, in particular between
players or coaches, on the one hand, and engaging entities, on the other, and
prohibits dual representation only in cases where the existence of a conflict
of interest is manifest, such as in the case of dual representation of a pla-
yer or coach and the releasing entity, the releasing entity and the engaging
entity, or where the agent intends to represent all the parties to the same
transaction.”88
85 RRC Sports, paragraph 117, citing Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
86 The English panel in the CAA Base case considered there to be no eect upon
competition. See: CAA Base, paragraph 354.
87 RRC Sports, paragraph 192.
88 RRC Sports, paragraph 194.
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In the free movement analysis, the EU Court of Justice also found the
rules on connected football agents89 to be justified, holding such rules to be
necessary to limit the possibility of an agent simultaneously representing a
player as well as the releasing and engaging clubs within the same transfer.
Thus, the EU Court of Justice endorsed the conflict of interest rules in
the FFAR, a finding that, incidentally, is consistent with other agent cases,
including the decisions of the English panel in CAA Base90 and the CAS
panel in PROFAA.91
6.2. COMPETITION ANALYSIS OF THE REMUNERATION
PROVISIONS IN THE FFAR
Central to the legal arguments between the parties was the nature of the
service fee cap, which the football agents characterised as a buyers’ cartel.
Following the Superleague judgment, the EU Court of Justice invited the
parties to submit additional written observations on the point, given that,
if the service fee cap did restrict competition by object, it would now be
justifiable only if it satisfied the conditions for an exemption under Article
101(3) TFEU (and no longer as a legitimate objective in the public interest
pursuant to the Meca Medina test).
In his Opinion, Advocate General Emiliou considered that the service fee
cap could not be equated with a buyers’ cartel that restricts competition by
object, given its dynamic nature:
“Moreover – and this is, for me, of the utmost importance – the rules at issue
do not set any specific binding maximum level of fees. In fact, there is no given
ceiling which the agents’ fees cannot exceed. The rules at issue only require that
the fees be linked to the transfer cost or to the salary of the player assisted by the
agent, through a percentage cap thereon. Yet, in so far as no maximum in respect
of those two parameters exists, and football clubs can and do compete to sign
up new players by oering higher transfer fees to the releasing clubs and salaries
to the players in question, the agents’ fees can also, as a consequence, increa-
se with no upper limit acting as a constraint. That is why, in these proceedings,
89 A ‘Connected Football Agent’ is defined in the FFAR as: “a Football Agent is connected
to another Football Agent as a result of their: (i) being employed or contractually
retained by the same Agency through which Football Agent Services are conducted;
(ii) both being directors, shareholders in, or co-owners of the same Agency through
which Football Agent Services are conducted; (iii) being married to one another,
domestic partners, siblings of one another, or parent and child or stepchild; or
(iv) them having made any contractual or other arrangements, whether formal or
informal, to cooperate, on more than one occasion, in the provision of any services
or to share the revenue or profits of any part of their Football Agent Services.”
90 CAA Base, paragraph 355.
91 PROFAA, section 3.7.
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certain parties referred to the cap set out in the FFAR as a dynamic maximum
price.”92
The EU Court of Justice observed that horizontal price collusion is, by
its very nature, detrimental to the proper functioning of the normal game
of competition, in particular with respect to the free determination of price,
quantity or quality. However, the EU Court of Justice recalled that not all
forms of price regulation are necessarily harmful to competition, notably
where it relates to a maximum price. Citing the Advocate General, the EU
Court of Justice continued:
“Since such a rule [as the service fee cap] does not establish a fixed remuneration
cap, but provides for a relative limit, being proportional, depending on the case,
either to the remuneration which the player or coach will receive when the agent
represents that individual or the engaging entity, or to the compensation paid by
the engaging entity to the releasing entity where the agent represents the latter,
it does not appear that rule is likely to prevent agents from osetting the eorts
they make in order, in particular, to improve the quality of their service by securing
higher remuneration, or that it is capable of dissuading them from oering their
services on the market concerned.”93
Moreover, the EU Court of Justice found the service fee cap to be
justified by a legitimate objective in the public interest in so far as it gives
rise to restrictive eects upon competition. Interestingly, the EU Court of
Justice noted the economic analysis provided by FIFA relating to market
failures in the market for agents’ services, particularly the information
asymmetry between agents and players, the ‘gatekeeper’ problem and
‘hold-up’ problem.94 However, the EU Court of Justice considered these to
be justifications of a purely economic nature that could not be regarded as
legitimate objectives in the public interest (but which would presumably fall
to be assessed under Article 101(3) TFEU as economic benefits arising from
the correction of market failures).95
Instead, the EU Court of Justice recognised that the service fee cap
pursued the legitimate objectives of protecting clients against conduct
by agents contrary to the ethical requirements and of protecting players
lacking experience of, or information about, the functioning of the football
transfer system.96 The service fee cap was considered to be necessary to
92 RRC Sports, Opinion of Advocate General Emiliou, paragraph 63.
93 RRC Sports, paragraph 122.
94 RRC Sports, paragraph 182.
95 RRC Sports, paragraph 196. Indeed, the EU Court of Justice observes at paragraph
224 that “the correction of a market failure is, in principle, capable of generating
such economic eciency gains...”
96 RRC Sports, paragraph 197.
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achieve these legitimate objectives. Indeed, the EU Court of Justice stated:
“Such rules are capable of preventing situations in which agents would
be motivated to act in an interest separate from that of their clients and,
therefore, reducing the risk that they are faced with a conflict of interest.”97
The service fee cap was deemed to be proportionate as it “is determined
in proportion either to the remuneration received by the player or coach
where the agent represents an individual or the engaging entity or to the
compensation paid by the engaging entity to the releasing entity, where the
agent represents the latter and that, in so doing, the operators concerned
retain the right to compete both on prices and on any other relevant
parameter, such as the quality of the services provided or innovation”.98
In addition, the EU Court of Justice observed that there is no limitation
on the revenues that an agent may generate from other services (not related
to the transfer) provided to players. The EU Court of Justice accepted that
the rebuttable presumption – that fees relating to other services provided
to players in the 24 months before or after a transfer are connected to the
agent’s service fee – was necessary to prevent circumvention of the service
fee cap.99
Similar findings were made with respect to the ‘client pays’ rule and
the 50% limit in cases of dual representation.100 In rejecting the ‘by object’
classification, the EU Court of Justice considered that the rule prevented
collusive conduct by agents.101 The fact that players and coaches were
deprived of the advantage of not having to pay the service fees themselves
was not disproportionate to the legitimate objective of preventing unethical
conduct or conflicts of interest. In particular, it ensured that agents acted in
the interest of the player, not of the person paying the service fee.102
The prohibition on fees derived from future transfers103 was considered
by the EU Court of Justice to relate merely to the calculation of service fees.
It does not prevent agents from competing on price.104
The same conclusion was reached with respect to the requirement that
the service fee be based either on a player’s remuneration or on the transfer
fee, as appropriate, since this requirement did not prevent competition
97 RRC Sports, paragraph 199.
98 RRC Sports, paragraph 204.
99 RRC Sports, paragraph 201.
100 Article 14(2) and (3) FFAR.
101 RRC Sports, paragraph 130.
102 RRC Sports, paragraph 205.
103 Article 15(1) FFAR read in conjunction with Article 18(1) of the FIFA Regulations on the
Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP).
104 RRC Sports, paragraphs 126–127.
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on price. Indeed, the EU Court of Justice stated that the rule was pro-
competitive because it encourages agents to endeavour to guarantee their
clients the eective payment of their remuneration.105
While accepting that the payment of agents pro rata throughout the
duration of the player’s contract was necessary to ensure that the agent
was paid for services actually provided to the player, the EU Court of Justice
raised a concern about the termination of payments to agents where a
player transfers. According to the EU Court of Justice, the prohibition on
payment where the agent had no role in the termination by a former client
player of his contract with a club (where the player is represented by a new
agent) would be “arbitrary” and a restriction of competition by object that
does not appear to be outweighed by economic benefits.106 That said, the
EU Court of Justice accepted that it would be appropriate to stop pro rata
payments where the same agent remains instructed by the departing player
concerned.
In summary, the EU Court of Justice endorsed the following FFAR rules
relating to agents’ service fees:
– service fee to be based on the player’s salary or the transfer fee
– service fee cap (and anti-circumvention measures)
– ‘client pays’ rules
– no interest in future transfers
– pro rata rule, except where the agent had no role in the early
termination by a player
6.3. COMPETITION ANALYSIS OF THE ETHICAL
REQUIREMENTS IN THE FFAR
The claim that the ethical requirements set out in Article 5 FFAR were,
by their very nature, harmful to competition was rejected. The EU Court
of Justice even doubted that the ethical requirements would have a
significant eect upon the market for agents’ services, noting that these
requirements were unlikely to deter most applicants.107 In any event, the
ethical requirements were justified.
The EU Court of Justice accepted that there was a legitimate rationale
for the no-approach rule (Article 16(1)(b) and (c) FFAR, which prohibits agents
from approaching players during an exclusive representation period until
105 RRC Sports, paragraph 131.
106 RRC Sports, paragraphs 136–138.
107 RRC Sports, paragraphs 146–149.
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two months before the end of the representation agreement). Such rules are
likely to strengthen the stability of contracts, in particular the eectiveness
of the duration of exclusive representation contracts already concluded.108
Provided that the no-approach period is not manifestly excessive, such rules
are not, by their very nature, harmful to competition.
However, the EU Court of Justice took issue with a potential interpretation
of the rule that would give incumbent agents an advantage by enabling
them simply to extend a representation contract before the window opened
to competition. Such an approach would restrict competition by object and
may not be justified.109 The EU Court of Justice made no firm finding, and
the interpretation of that rule will have to be settled by the national court –
subject to any clarification by FIFA as to its application.
7. DISCLOSURE AND PUBLICATION
A number of disclosure and publication requirements (relating to the
agency110 as well as the service fee and fees for other services111) were
challenged under EU competition law and, separately, under EU data
protection law.
7.1. DISCLOSURE AND PUBLICATION: COMPETITION ANALYSIS
From a competition perspective, the contested disclosure requirements
do not restrict competition by object. The requirements were put in place to
ensure adherence to the FFAR. The EU Court of Justice held that “Since FIFA
108 In the free movement analysis, the EU Court of Justice acknowledged that the
window may benefit players, who now have a clear time frame in which to consider
various options. See: RRC Sports, paragraph 307.
109 RRC Sports, paragraph 158.
110 Article 16(2)(k)(ii) FFAR: “within 14 days of the first Transaction involving the Agency:
the number of Football Agents that use the same Agency to conduct their business
aairs and the name of all its employees”.
111 Article 16(2)(j)(ii)–(v) FFAR: “(ii) within 14 days of execution: any agreement with a Client
other than a Representation Agreement, including but not limited to agreements
relating to Other Services and the information requested on the Platform; (iii.) within
14 days of payment of a service fee: the information requested on the Platform; (iv.)
within 14 days of payment of a fee related to any agreement entered into with a
Client other than a Representation Agreement: the information requested on the
Platform; (v.) within 14 days of occurrence: any contractual or other arrangement
between Football Agents to cooperate in the provision of any services or to share
the revenue or profits of any part of their Football Agent Services.”
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is not active in any of the markets in question, such a mechanism for collecting
information does not, in itself – subject to the possible dissemination or use
of that information – have any impact on the operation of competition.”112
As for the publication requirements, the EU Court of Justice considered
that the information was not necessarily confidential, in particular as it
may relate to historical information, and that, “given that such information
relates to transactions that have already taken place, it cannot, in principle,
reveal the strategy which those persons intend to implement with
regard to what constitutes one or more parameters in the light of which
competition on those markets is established, with the result that it also
cannot, in principle, be regarded as strategic”.113 Indeed, the information
may encourage competition since, “on a market characterised by a spread
of market participants, the disclosure and publication of such information
may, conversely, help to stimulate competition”.114
In any event, the contested disclosure and publication requirements
are justified by the legitimate objectives pursued by the FFAR, as they may
be regarded as part of the means necessary to achieve those objectives.
Simply put, the disclosure requirements enable FIFA “first ... to verify
compliance with those regulations and, second, to enable the addressees
of those regulations to comply with them”.115 From the EU Court of Justice’s
perspective, there do not appear to be any less restrictive measures available
that would be as eective. Nor can it be assumed that the disclosure would
result in disproportionate restrictions of competition.116
The exception to these findings from a competition law perspective relates
to the requirement upon FIFA at Article 19(e) FFAR117 to make available details
of “all transactions involving player agents”. According to the EU Court of
Justice, such broad wording leaves too much room for the possibility that
the disclosure of the information covered by it is not necessary to achieve
the objective of ensuring the proper application of the FFAR. In particular, it
may enable competing agents to learn the amount of compensation paid
to agents. However, the EU Court of Justice did not dismiss the legitimacy
of this disclosure rule entirely, noting that “some price transparency is
necessary in order to enable agents wishing to approach new clients to
oer competitive prices...” Instead, the EU Court of Justice considered that
“access to anonymised data, such as the spread of the prices charged by all
112 RRC Sports, paragraph 160.
113 RRC Sports, paragraph 165.
114 RRC Sports, paragraph 167.
115 RRC Sports, paragraph 214.
116 RRC Sports, paragraph 215.
117 Now Article 19(1)(e) FFAR.
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agents in relation to average prices, might prove sucient for the purposes
of achieving that objective”.118
7.2. DISCLOSURE AND PUBLICATION: DATA PROTECTION ANALYSIS
From a data protection perspective, the processing of personal data
is lawful pursuant to Article 6(1)(f) GDPR119 if it satisfies three cumulative
conditions: (i) the controller or a third party must have a legitimate interest;
(ii) the processing must be necessary to pursue that legitimate interest; and
(iii) the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subjects
whose data is to be protected must not override the legitimate interest of
the controller or a third party.120
As for a legitimate interest, the EU Court of Justice held that there was
a ‘relevant and appropriate relationship’,121 given that “the natural persons
whose data agents may provide to FIFA, on the basis of Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to
(v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR, are all involved in competitions organised by FIFA
or by confederations or federations aliated to it, and the data that may
be so provided relate to the professional activities of those natural persons
carried out in connection with those sporting competitions...”122
The processing of the data listed in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) –
albeit numerous – is limited to what is necessary to ensure compliance with
the FFAR. In particular, the requirement in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) FFAR to report
any agreement with a client that is not a representation agreement – notably
118 RRC Sports, paragraph 217.
119 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC OJ L
119, 4.5.2016, p. 1 (“General Data Protection Regulation” or “GDPR”).
120 RRC Sports, paragraphs 317–319.
121 Recital 47 GDPR states: “The legitimate interests of a controller, including those of
a controller to which the personal data may be disclosed, or of a third party, may
provide a legal basis for processing, provided that the interests or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of the data subject are not overriding, taking into consideration
the reasonable expectations of data subjects based on their relationship with the
controller. Such legitimate interest could exist for example where there is a relevant
and appropriate relationship between the data subject and the controller in situations
such as where the data subject is a client or in the service of the controller. At any
rate the existence of a legitimate interest would need careful assessment including
whether a data subject can reasonably expect at the time and in the context of the
collection of the personal data that processing for that purpose may take place. [...]”
122 RRC Sports, paragraph 331.
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contracts for other services – makes it possible to ensure that the service
fee cap and other FFAR requirements123 are not circumvented.124
In terms of balancing the interests, the EU Court of Justice acknowledged
that compliance with the FFAR is of “considerable importance to FIFA”.125
Subject to verification by the national court, the judgment concluded that
“the processing of personal data provided for in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and
(k)(ii) of the FFAR is based on a fair balance between, on the one hand, the
interests and fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subjects and,
on the other, the legitimate interests pursued by the controller”.126 Thus, it is
likely that the provisions comply with Article 6(1) GDPR.
Turning to the publication of data pursuant to Article 19 FFAR (e.g.
information on agents, their clients, nature and duration of representation,
transactions, service fees), the EU Court of Justice considered that the
dissemination of the data fell within the scope of the GDPR. As with
disclosure, the EU Court of Justice recognised compliance with the FFAR as
a legitimate objective.127
In terms of necessity, the EU Court of Justice observed that the provisions
of Article 19 FFAR do not specify which category of persons may have
access to the dierent categories of information. However, the EU Court of
Justice took a pragmatic approach, finding that “lack of precision cannot,
in itself, render that article contrary to [Article 6(1)(f) GDPR], if and in so far
as the referring court finds that such a lack of precision does not mean
that all those categories of persons will have indiscriminate access to all of
that information”.128 Nor does the lack of precision prevent the EU Court of
Justice from making observations as to the categories of persons in respect
of whom each personal data processing operation provided for in Article 19
FFAR could be justified.129
In fact, the EU Court of Justice considered the disclosure of the following
information under Article 19(a)–(c) FFAR to be necessary and proportionate130
to the achievement of the objectives of the FFAR, for the following reasons:
– disclosure of the names and details of agents to other agents (Article
19(a) FFAR131), to enable agents to fulfil their obligations under the
123 Notably those at Article 12(8) and (9) FFAR.
124 RRC Sports, paragraph 334.
125 RRC Sports, paragraph 341.
126 RRC Sports, paragraph 342.
127 RRC Sports, paragraph 354.
128 RRC Sports, paragraph 356.
129 RRC Sports, paragraph 357.
130 RRC Sports, paragraph 371.
131 Now Article 19(1)(a) FFAR.
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FFAR, since this data is in any case necessary to contact an agent
representing a player or coach regarding a potential recruitment.132
– disclosure and publication of this information to clubs, single-
entity leagues, players and coaches, since there is no other means
for persons wishing to be represented by an agent to verify, in
accordance with Article 18(1)(c) FFAR, whether the service provider
with whom they intend to enter into an agency agreement has in fact
been licensed by FIFA.133
– disclosure of the identity of the clients represented by each football
agent as well as the exclusivity or non-exclusivity of the representation
and the term of the agency agreement, which is required to enable
compliance with the no-approach rule pursuant to Article 16 FFAR134
as well as to ensure compliance with Article 18bis RSTP (relating to
third-party influence).135
However, the EU Court of Justice considered that the publication of all
transactions would not be in line with the GDPR and, in particular, with the
principle of data minimisation.136
With respect to the publication of sanctions specifically under Article
19(d) FFAR137, the EU Court of Justice doubted that Article 10 GDPR (relating
to criminal convictions and oences) was applicable as the sanctions
concerned were not imposed pursuant to criminal proceedings.138
Publication therefore also had to be justified pursuant to Article 6(1) GDPR.
In this respect, the EU Court of Justice followed its recent ruling in NADA
(relating to publication of anti-doping sanctions),139 noting that publication
can have an important dissuasive eect:
“as regards the processing provided for in Article 19(d) of the FFAR, consisting of
the disclosure and publication of any sanctions imposed on agents or clients, it
should be noted that such processing may be necessary, in that it may constitute
a more eective and dissuasive sanction than a fine, in so far as the consequences
of disclosing such sanctions are dicult to predict, thus rendering unreliable any
cost-benefit assessment of non-compliance with the rule in question. Furthermo-
re, such processing may prove necessary to enable persons who may have been
132 RRC Sports, paragraph 358.
133 RRC Sports, paragraph 359.
134 RRC Sports, paragraph 362.
135 RRC Sports, paragraph 361.
136 RRC Sports, paragraph 370.
137 Now Article 19(1)(d) FFAR.
138 RRC Sports, paragraphs 348–352.
139 Case C-474/24, Nationale Anti-Doping Agentur Austria GmbH, EU:C:2026:579
(“NADA”).
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harmed by the breach of the FFAR that led to the sanction to become aware of the
matter.”140
Publication of the sanctions was found to be an integral part of the
sanction itself, and therefore suitable for restoring confidence in the
relevant markets and facilitating the exercise of claims for damages by
potentially aggrieved persons.141 That said, the publication of all information
relating to sanctions may not be proportionate, with the EU Court of Justice
requiring an assessment of the gravity and relevance of the sanction before
publication. Similarly, the publication of sanctions after their completion
may not be proportionate.142 Other than this narrow concern, the publication
of sanctions pursuant to Article 19 FFAR is compatible with data protection
rights.
8. FFAR AND CLAIMS OF ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
Much like Odysseus landing in Ithaca only to be confronted with new
challenges, sports federations often face claims not just under Article 101
TFEU but also under Article 102 TFEU and the free movement rules. The
allegations of abuse are usually almost identical – presumably thrown in by
claimants in the hope that any rule escaping prohibition under Article 101
TFEU will instead be caught as an abuse of dominance or restriction of free
movement. In practice, the exercise usually involves similar considerations
with the same arguments being made and considered in triplicate. This
article therefore focuses on the distinguishing features of the EU Court of
Justice’s analysis.
As the EU Court of Justice recalled in RRC Sports, Articles 101 and 102
TFEU must be applied coherently, having regard to the specific features of
each provision.143 There is, however, an important dierence: for Article 102
TFEU to apply to sports federations, dominance must be established. There
has been a lazy tendency to assume that sports federations are dominant
in all cases merely by virtue of their regulatory functions. However, in RRC
Sports the EU Court of Justice provided some detail on the factors to be
considered in establishing dominance.
First, the EU Court of Justice accepted that FIFA is not itself an economic
operator active in the relevant markets primarily aected by the FFAR, namely
140 RRC Sports, paragraph 371.
141 RRC Sports, paragraph 378.
142 RRC Sports, paragraph 382.
143 RRC Sports, paragraph 235, citing Superleague, paragraph 119.
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the market for agents’ services as well as the labour market for players and
coaches.144 The situation therefore diers from that in Superleague. However,
in his Opinion, Advocate General Emiliou stated that “an undertaking can,
de jure or de facto, exercise a regulatory role, determining the conditions in
which undertakings may access a given market and shaping the conditions
in which those undertakings can then compete...”145 The EU Court of Justice
agreed with this analysis, finding that FIFA may aect access to the relevant
market for agents’ services.146 Later in the judgment, the EU Court of Justice
explained that this position of dominance “stems from the regulatory,
supervisory, and sanctioning powers it exercises in those markets”.147 This
finding also presupposes that, for dominance to be established, there must
be a genuine impact upon access to the relevant markets concerned, not
just an ancillary link.
Holding a position of dominance is not prohibited by Article 102 TFEU;
there must be an abuse.148 The test for abuse of a dominant position is based
on determining whether the conduct in question deviates from competition
on the merits and whether it is capable of actually or potentially restricting
competition by driving equally capable competitors out of the relevant
market(s) or by preventing their development in those markets.149
The mere regulation of agents by FIFA is not an abuse. The EU Court
of Justice considered that, if FIFA were to use its regulatory powers “to
limit, steer or regulate the growth of competition on the market for agents’
services in accordance with the economic or competitive interests of ...
clubs that are members of the national associations aliated to it, such
conduct could be classified as abuse of a dominant position and, more
specifically, exclusionary abuse, even if the eects of that conduct were to
manifest themselves on related or neighbouring markets to those on which
FIFA carries on its own economic activities”.150 The same applies if FIFA does
so in its own economic interests. This must be established on the basis of
a detailed, comprehensive and overall analysis of the conduct in question,
144 RRC Sports, paragraph 242.
145 RRC Sports, Opinion of Advocate General Emiliou, paragraph 137.
146 RRC Sports, paragraph 243.
147 RRC Sports, paragraphs 244 and 261. While not directly addressed, the EU Court of
Justice seems to take a functional approach, noting FIFA’s regulatory and review
powers and the power to impose sanctions on the relevant markets for football
agents’ services.
148 RRC Sports, paragraph 251.
149 RRC Sports, paragraph 257, citing the legal test set out in Superleague, paragraph
129, and Case C-48/22 P, Google and Alphabet v. Commission, EU:C:2024:726
(“Google Shopping”), paragraph 165.
150 RRC Sports, paragraph 265.
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which presupposes an examination of the nature, content and actual or
potential eects of the rules adopted by FIFA.151
To establish an abuse, as the EU Court of Justice states: “it is necessary
to demonstrate that the undertaking in a dominant position imposed, in its
interest, on its customers or on other trading partners, conditions for the
pursuit of their activity which have no objective economic, technical or legal
justification.”152 The existence of an abuse of a dominant position could thus
be established if “a reasonably ecient sports federation, in a comparable
situation, would have been led to adopt rules dierent from those at issue,
which, while suitable for attaining the objectives pursued, would have been
significantly less harmful to the agents’ own interests”.153
This is a high standard for a claimant to meet. It requires proving that
no sports association would reasonably have put in place the contested
regulations. It recognises that it is not the role of courts to ‘step into the
shoes’ of sports federations. A sports federation may choose between
a number of dierent regulatory options. The fact that it chooses one
approach rather than another does not mean that there is an abuse: the
choice must be one which no reasonable sports federation would have
taken. This reasonableness standard has been central to the approach of
the EU Court of Justice since the Wouters and Meca Medina cases.
Even if an abuse is established, FIFA is entitled to put forward justifications.
These may include public interest objectives, economic eciencies or other
objective justifications.
9. FFAR AND FREE MOVEMENT
A feature of the application of EU law to sports regulation is that the
free movement rules may apply in parallel with EU competition law. In RRC
Sports, the EU Court of Justice noted that the provision on freedom to
provide services “is primarily addressed to the Member States” but that it
may “nevertheless apply where a group or organization exercises certain
powers over individuals and may subject them to conditions equivalent
to those which a Member State might impose on them”.154 As Advocate
151 RRC Sports, paragraph 266.
152 RRC Sports, paragraph 272.
153 RRC Sports, paragraph 273.
154 RRC Sports, paragraph 285, citing Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch, EU:C:1974:140,
paragraph 17; Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97, Deliège, EU:C:2000:199, paragraph
47, and Case C-22/18, TopFit and Bi, EU:C:2019:497, paragraph 39.
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General Szpunar observed in the Diarra case, this parallel application gives
rise to some tension in terms of retaining a coherent approach with EU
competition law.155
For the free movement rules to apply, it must first be established that
there is an obstacle to free movement. In his Opinion, Advocate General
Emiliou observed that the FFAR arguably removed obstacles by providing
for a uniform system across the European Union:
“First, it is true that, to some extent, the rules at issue have the eect of harmoni-
sing, at EU level, the requirements for exercising the activity of an agent. In a way,
this body of rules favours the free movement of services, since agents established
in one Member State can, almost automatically, provide their services as agents
in any other Member State. Indeed, although some Member States do have legis-
lation which diverges from the FFAR (and which thus obliges the relevant national
football associations to adopt rules which partly complement or supersede the
FFAR), I understand that the key rules of the FFAR are applicable throughout the
European Union.”156
However, the Advocate General considered that some provisions may
make it more dicult to provide cross-border services. The EU Court of
Justice followed this line of thinking.
The EU Court of Justice recalled that an obstacle does not necessarily
arise simply because “less strict or more commercially favourable rules
could have applied if those rules had not been adopted”.157 On this basis,
the EU Court of Justice stated that the FFAR remuneration rules “cannot
be regarded as imposing a restriction on that freedom to provide services
solely because they regulate the remuneration of agents and coaches or
the methods for calculating or paying that remuneration”.158 The eects of
155 Advocate General Szpunar stated at paragraph 34 of his Opinion in Case C-650/22,
FIFA v. BZ, Opinion of AG Szpunar, EU:C:2024:375; Judgment EU:C:2024:824
(“Diarra”): “In addition, in some instances, the Court has found the same set of facts
to be subject to both the fundamental freedoms and the rules on competition. In
other words, the approach was no longer a binary choice (either competition rules or
fundamental freedoms), but a parallel (or cumulative) one. Given the initial rationale
of the Treaties described above, the question may arise as to which reasons have led
the Court to this approach. Obviously, while such a parallel application of provisions
may lead to the desirable situation that no rules adopted by an entity such as FIFA
escape the remit of Union law, it does not come without diculties: what happens
when, say, a contested provision is found to be compatible with Article 101 TFEU,
but incompatible with Article 45 TFEU, or vice versa? The intuitive answer is clear:
both sets of rules (competition and fundamental freedoms) must be appraised
independently on their merits.”
156 RRC Sports, Opinion of Advocate General Emiliou, paragraph 148.
157 RRC Sports, paragraph 289.
158 RRC Sports, paragraph 290.
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other provisions, such as the disclosure and publication provisions, were too
uncertain to give rise to a restriction on freedom of movement.159
The EU Court of Justice doubted that the requirement to adhere to FIFA
regulations or to submit to the CAS was likely to deter agents from providing
their services in other Member States.160 However, it left this matter for the
national court to determine. Notwithstanding this, the judgment recognised
that it is legitimate to have “a uniform legal framework, together with a
mechanism of supervision by a single decision-making body”.161 The EU
Court of Justice also stated that such requirements relating to the licensing
of agents may be justified by the need “to guarantee the integrity of the
transfer system and of sporting competitions more broadly, and to improve
the professional standards applicable to that activity”.162
It is only with respect to certain FFAR provisions that the EU Court of
Justice found that there may be obstacles to agents in the manner in which
they provide their services, notably the ethical requirements for licensing,
the no-approach rule and the restrictions on multiple representation.163 In
this respect, the EU Court of Justice essentially applied, mutatis mutandis,
the same reasoning as in the EU competition law analysis to the relevant
FFAR provisions.164
10. RETURN TO NATIONAL COURTS
After the English arbitral decision relating to the Football Association’s
national rules, the FFAR was declared by some commentators “to be almost
certainly dead”.165 Blown o course, the FFAR persevered and continued its
legal journey. The judgment of the EU Court of Justice is an emphatic victory
for FIFA. The Football Agents cases questioned the legitimacy of almost all
the provisions in the FFAR. The right to regulate agents, to require licences,
to require adherence to FIFA’s regulations, to apply a service fee cap, to
prohibit conflicts of interest, to require disclosure, to publish information –
all upheld.
159 RRC Sports, paragraph 291.
160 RRC Sports, paragraph 295.
161 RRC Sports, paragraph 303.
162 RRC Sports, paragraph 304.
163 RRC Sports, paragraph 288.
164 RRC Sports, paragraphs 299–302.
165 De Marco, “The end of the FIFA Agents Cap and the beginning of a less restrained
standard of competition review in sport?”
LawinSport.com
, first published 14
December 2023 (accessed 24 July 2026).
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Strangely, much has been made in commentary following the delivery of
the Football Agents judgments of the fact that it will now fall to the referring
national court to resolve the case. However, this is a basic feature of the
EU preliminary ruling procedure:166 it is not an appeal but rather a judicial
dialogue between national courts and the EU Court of Justice on the
interpretation of EU law.167 Likewise, the European Commission and Member
States all intervene in cases to assist the EU Court of Justice. It will be for
the national court to resolve the case having regard to the facts, but it must
do so in accordance with the judgment of the EU Court of Justice, which is
binding upon it.
So, the case will return for final resolution to the German court in Mainz
that referred it. The judgment will also be binding upon other courts in the
EU hearing similar cases that have stayed their proceedings pending the
judgment. It is likely to be highly influential in other jurisdictions, being by far
the most important judicial authority on the compatibility of the FFAR with
competition law principles, many of which are based on concepts similar
to those in the EU. Notwithstanding the judgment, FIFA has announced its
intention to proceed with a further consultation with agents to refine the
FFAR.168 Perhaps the Football Agents judgments will bring that most precious
of judicial outcomes at the end of this epic legal journey: reconciliation.
“So Athena commanded. Odysseus obeyed her, glad at heart. And Athena han-
ded down her pacts of peace between both sides for all the years to come...”
The Odyssey (Homer, translation of the final lines by Robert Fagles)
* * *
166 Article 267 TFEU.
167 Indeed, the preliminary ruling procedure before the EU Court of Justice is not,
technically speaking, an adversarial process, but rather a procedure by which the
parties assist the EU Court of Justice in coming to its judgment. It is for this reason
that written observations before the EU Court of Justice are not exchanged in
sequence (e.g. with a claim and defence) but rather submitted simultaneously, subject
to some minor variations to account for rules on service or for technical amendments
to written observations requested by the Registry to conform with the standards
of the EU Court of Justice. The parties receive copies of the other parties’ written
observations at the same time, so no party has advance notice of the arguments of
the other party.
168 FIFA Press Release, “FIFA welcomes Court of Justice of the European Union decision
on FIFA Football Agent Regulations”, 16 July 2026.