HOW TO RECONCILE CONTRACTUAL STABILITY IN FOOTBALL WITH FREE COMPETITION? LESSONS FROM THE DIARRA CASE
Keywords:
Contractual Stability, Free Movement, Free Competition, TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), Indemnification, Proportionality, Diarra, Sports sanctionsAbstract
This article analyses the implications of the recent Diarra ruling, aiming to examine how the decision redefines the tension between the pursuit of contractual stability in football and the principles of free movement of workers and free competition, as established in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The analysis focuses on how FIFA regulations, designed to protect employment contracts, may restrict players’ rights and competition among clubs. The ruling argues that Article 17 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) may impose restrictions on free movement and competition, both in its objectives and effects. This rule would limit players’ ability to change clubs and clubs’ ability to sign contracted players, violating Articles 45 and 101 of the TFEU. The decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) criticises the compensation system for contract termination, considering it disproportionate and discretionary, questioning the joint liability of the new club and the use of the International Transfer Certificate (ITC) as unjustified pressure tools.
This work contributes to the debate on FIFA’s role as the governing body of world football and proposes a review of Article 17 of the RSTP to balance contractual stability with players’ rights and competition among clubs, advocating for alternatives that protect contracts without violating the principles of the TFEU.